Maritime Safety: Learning from Experience

Society learns by the mistakes it makes. The shipping industry is no exception, and it learned reams and volumes from the catastrophes that befell the RMS Titanic and the SS Morro Castle. The Titanic was designed and built between 1909 and 1911 using the finest technology available in the early 20th century. The Morro Castle was built between 1929 and 1930 with 75 percent government financing under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928. Despite their vastly different origins, both succumbed to weaknesses in their systems.

RMS Titanic 

As history and a number of books and movies have told us, the RMS Titanic sank after an iceberg tore a gash of at least 300 feet in the starboard hull, rupturing five of sixteen compartments. Modern investigators say the hull was penetrable because metallurgy and riveting were not advanced in the early 20th century. In fact, they have proven that the rolled steel plates that were used to clad the Titanic became very brittle when exposed to cold water and that this caused the ship to sink more quickly than it would have, otherwise. Modern investigators go so far as to say that modern metallurgy and seamless construction may not even be enough to prevent a rupture of such great magnitude. They cite the sinking of the SS Costa Concordia in 2012 as an example.

Other factors were at play, as well. There was no moonlight to light the way, and the sea was calm, precluding waves from crashing against the iceberg that would have alerted the watchmen aboard the Titanic. The watchmen did not have binoculars due to an oversight in Southampton, England, where the cruise originated, although sources say binoculars would have been ineffective on that dark night. In addition, search and rescue efforts were flawed. Although the merchant ship SS Californian was only six miles away and could see flares and hear SOS messages from the Titanic, it did not respond for undisclosed reasons. Although the RMS Carpathia responded, it was so far away that, by the time it arrived, it could only pick up lifeboat survivors. Passengers and crew who jumped into the frigid sea water died of hypothermia within minutes.

SS Morro Castle

The SS Morro Castle, a passenger cruise liner, was carrying 489 passengers and 240 crew through high winds and seas. On the night of September 7, 1934, the ship’s captain died of a heart attack, and the chief officer was in control. On the night of September 8, 1934, as a nor’easter (severe storm) was whipping up the northeastern coastline, the SS Morro Castle was making its way along Long Island, en route to New York Harbor. Fire broke out in a storage cupboard in the first-class writing room on the B Deck. Within thirty minutes, the ship was fully ablaze, only half of its lifeboats had been deployed, and passengers and crew were having to decide whether to risk jumping into the stormy waters or to burn to death.

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So, what went wrong? The investigation uncovered several important facts, all of which contributed to the catastrophe:

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-  The ship was constructed quickly and inexpensively in an effort to stay within budget of shipbuilding financing provided by the government under the Merchant Marine Act of 1928. It seems likely that corners were cut where they should not have been.

-  The ship was constructed of flammable materials. The handsome wood walls were glued pressboard. The finishes were made of flammable varnishes. Although doorways were fire resistant, a six-inch gap between them and the wooden ceilings allowed air to fan the flames. As a result, escaping the inferno was hampered.

-  The flues leading up from the engines were not properly insulated. As a result, material located near the flues was resting against red-hot flues. Blankets treated with flammable dry cleaning fluid were stored in the cabinet in the writing room, where the fire originated. In addition, because of the storm, the engines were stoked to full capacity, making the flues hotter than normal.

-  Water pressure was not adequate to operate all fire hydrants. As a result, insufficient water was available to extinguish the flames.

-  The fire quickly penetrated electrical and communication lines. As a result, the ship was plunged into darkness, making escape more difficult, and rescuers received only one SOS signal from the ship.

-  There was no coordinated effort by maritime officers to fight and control the fire, close the fire doors, or direct passengers to safety.

-  Rescue efforts were completely inadequate despite the Morro Castle’s close proximity to shore. Crew had been trained, but passengers had not. Few lifeboats were deployed, and those that were primarily held crew members with passengers being left aboard ship to decide whether to risk drowning by jumping or burning by staying aboard. Too, lack of training meant they did not know how to use the life preservers and often were knocked unconscious or suffered broken necks from their improper usage. The high waves made it difficult for rescuers to spot victims in the water.

Lessons Learned

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Improvements to ship construction and operation arose from the SS Morro Castle fire. 

-  Ships were required to be constructed entirely of fire-retardant materials; have automatic fire doors, ship-wide fire alarms, emergency generators, backup systems for lighting and communications, and adequate numbers of life jackets and life boats for the numbers of passengers and crew aboard. 

-  Life jackets must be colored bright orange to make them more easily spotted in the water by rescuers. 

-  Life boats must be easy to lower and enclosed to protect occupants from the cold ocean water and wind. 

-  Both passengers and crew must receive safety training before the ship leaves port. Training must include how to reach an outside deck and join one’s teammates, how to use life jackets, and how to lower lifeboats, among other issues.

-  Crews must receive training in firefighting.

-  Reforms must be made in the licensing of Merchant Marine officers. This led in part to the establishment of the US Merchant Marine Academy.

Conclusion

Although maritime deaths still occur, they are far fewer aboard ships where safety procedures are followed from the drafting board to the lifeboat. In 1912, 1516 of 2229 passengers and crew (68%) died when the Titanic went down. In 1934, 137 of 549 passengers and crew (25%) died when the Morro Castle burned. In 2012, 32 of 4252 passengers and crew (<1%) died when theCosta Concordia sank. Safe construction materials and practices; well-planned passenger, crew, and rescue procedures; and diligent training of passengers, crew, and rescue personnel make a huge difference in maritime safety.